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ARGUMENT 
In arguing that its mining of the uneonfined Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer does not 
constitute a taking of a protectable property interest, the City mischaracterizes the 
Group's claims. According to the City, the Group is attempting to assert control over the 
ground water to make the Group's surface water rights more "effective." In making this 
characterization, the City fails to recognize that its actions have not merely made the 
Group's surface water rights less effective; rather, the City has taken the Group's 
beneficial use of water, the very essence of their water rights. 
The City does not dispute that its conduct has created an artificial condition under 
the Group's properties that intercepts and draws the Group's surface irrigation waters 
nearly 100 feet below ground level to replenish the waters mined by the City.1 Instead, 
the City argues only that it, and not the Group, has appropriated the underground water 
and that, therefore, it is legally entitled to take the groundwater and the Group's irrigation 
water without constraint. 
However, had the artificial condition created by the City's conduct been visible 
above ground, rather than being underground, the City could not make such an argument. 
For example, rather than creating an artificial cone of depression that intercepts the 
1
 This artificial condition, a large cone of depression (i.e., the lowering of the water table 
in an inverted cone with the wells at the center), was formed as a direct result of the 
City's continuous over-pumping of the Hayden Well Field wells. It intercepts and 
captures the Group's surface waters, which were intended to be used to irrigate the 
Group's lands. Once the artificial cone of depression has captured and directed the North 
Hayden Group's waters down to replenish the aquifer, the City is able to pump that very 
same water from the aquifer to the surface through its wells. 
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Group's surface water rights by capturing and drawing those waters down nearly 100 feet 
to replenish the water taken from the aquifer, had the City simply directly intercepted the 
Group's surface waters while the water was still on the surface and diverted that water 
into the City's wells, there would be no question that the City would be liable to the 
Group for interfering with and taking their surface water rights. Yet, merely because the 
City's interception occurs below the surface, the City argues it cannot be liable for taking 
or interfering with the Group's water rights. Such an argument must be rejected pursuant 
to the basic principles of Utah water law that protect a water right holder's right, in fact, a 
duty, to beneficially use his or her water right. 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
THE NORTH HAYDEN GROUP'S TAKINGS CLAIMS. THE GROUP HAS A PROTECTABLE 
PROPERTY INTEREST IN (1) THEIR SURFACE WATER RIGHTS, (2) THEIR LANDS, AND 
(3) THE NEAR-SURFACE WATER LOCATED ON THEIR PROPERTY 
The Group asserts three separate and independent protectable property interests 
taken by the City through its creation of the large cone of depression caused by its 
continuous over-pumping of the Hayden wells: (1) the taking of the Group's surface 
waters rights; (2) the taking of the value and use of the Group's lands by preventing the 
Group from using their surface waters to irrigate their once-productive farm and pasture 
lands; and (3) the taking of the near-surface water to which the Group is entitled. As the 
City has conflated these separate property interests in its treatment of the takings issue, it 
is important that each property interest be addressed separately on its merits. 
a. The Group Has a Protectable Property Interest in the Beneficial Use of 
Their Surface Water Rights 
In its brief, the City argues that the Group's right to beneficially use their surface 
4819-1650-4068/NO075-001 9 
water rights is not a protectable property interest. However, such an argument flies in the 
face of Utah's water and real property law. Both Utah's Legislature and its courts have 
consistently and emphatically declared that the right to use water in this State is defined 
by the amount of water beneficially used by the water right holder. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-1-3 (2009) ("Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights 
to the use of water in this state."); Melville v. Salt Lake County, 570 P.2d 687, 688 (Utah 
1977) ("One's right to use water is measured by the amount he puts to beneficial use 
without interfering with another person's prior right to the use of the water."). Indeed, in 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Gailey, 328 P.2d 175 (Utah 1958), a case 
heavily relied upon by the City, this Court emphasized that a water right holder's interest 
in a water right is dependent upon the beneficial use of that right, declaring as follows: 
The historical development of our water law indicates that rights to the use 
of water are firmly grounded upon three things: (1) initiative in discovering 
useable water resources, (2) industry in taking overt action to bring the 
water under control for the purpose of putting it to a beneficial use, and (3) 
diligence in continuing the use thus established. The foregoing constitute 
the only recognized foundation upon which rights in water can be created 
and maintained. 
Id. at 178 (emphasis added). Consequently, without the ability to put their water to 
beneficial use, water right holders not only lose the most important stick in their bundle 
of property rights, they are also not legally entitled to maintain the water rights, and the 
Utah law considers a water right to be real property. See Utah Dept. of Trans, v. G. 
Kay, Inc., 2003 UT 40, ^ 15, 78 P.3d 612 (recognizing that "[wjater rights are a type of 
interest in real property"). The often used real property analogy of the property right 
being like a "bundle of sticks" is particularly applicable here. The City has taken the 
most important stick, i.e., beneficial use. 
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water rights are subject to forfeiture. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 73-l-4(2)(a) (2009). 
"In Utah, 'ownership' of water rights is equated with 'right to use.'" Strawberry 
Water Users Assoc, v. Bureau of Reclamation, 2006 UT 19, ^ f 61, 133 P.3d 410. As such, 
Utah law safeguards a water right holder's right to beneficially use the water by 
protecting both the quantity and quality of the water to which he or she is entitled. See 
Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, f 22 n.6, 5 P.3d 1206 ("We have 
consistently held that an appropriator of water rights also owns a vested interest in the 
sources of that water, and no one may interfere with the source of the appropriator's 
water supply in a way that diminishes the quantity or quality of the appropriated water."); 
Sigurd City v. State, 142 P.2d 154, 157 (Utah 1943) ("To the extent that the plaintiffs 
taking of the waters of Rosses Creek deprived the defendants of the use of water which 
would otherwise have been used upon their lands the plaintiff has taken the defendants' 
water."3 (emphasis added)); Fisher v. Bountiful City, 59 P. 520, 521 (Utah 1899) ("The 
dominion and right to the use of the water, and the control and diversion of the same for 
irrigation, culinary, and other beneficial purposes, was vested in the plaintiffs by their 
appropriation and use, and they could not be deprived of such right, except by their 
voluntary act, by forfeiture, or by operation of law." (emphasis added)). 
Accordingly, given the essential role beneficial use plays in the creation, 
The City attempts to distinguish the holding in Sigurd City by claiming that it is limited 
to water that has been both appropriated and beneficially used. (Appellee's Br. at 12.) 
However, this argument is irrelevant to the Group's takings claim regarding their surface 
water rights as it is uncontested that the Group is lawfully entitled to the surface water 
rights, all of which have been lawfully appropriated pursuant to state law and were 
beneficially used long before the City began mining the unconfined aquifer. 
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maintenance, and utility of a water right, this Court must recognize that a water right 
holder not only has a right to protect the source but also a right to protect the beneficial 
use of water as a protectable property interest under Utah law. 
The City also attempts to attack the Group's claim that the City has taken their 
surface water rights by arguing that the Group has no interest in the near-surface waters 
below their lands. But, as discussed, infra, Subsection C, such an argument is contrary to 
Utah law. More importantly, however, such an argument is irrelevant to the claim that 
the City has taken the Group's surface water rights. 
As noted above, although the Group has asserted that the City's mining of the 
Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer has taken a protectable property interest in the Group's lands 
and near-surface water rights, these claims are separate and independent from the 
Group's claim that the City's conduct has also resulted in a taking of the Group's surface 
water rights. The Group has presented undisputed evidence, including evidence from a 
licensed Professional Geologist, Jack Rogers, P.G., establishing that the City's conduct in 
mining the unconfmed Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer has caused an artificial vacuum to 
form beneath the Group's properties. Indeed, the evidence shows that the City's 
continuous over-pumping of the Hayden wells has dramatically reduced the water table 
4
 Because this claim is based on the City's taking of the Group's surface water rights, the 
cases relied upon by the City in support of its arguments are inapposite. Specifically, in 
both JJ.N.P. Co. v. State, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982), and Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District v. Gailey, 328 P.2d 175 (Utah 1958), the only issue before the 
Court was whether the plaintiffs had obtained an ownership interest in certain waters 
based solely on their ownership of land. JJ.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137; Weber Basin, 328 
P.2d at 176. Neither case concerned the issue before this Court, i.e., whether the conduct 
of a governmental entity has deprived a water right holder of the ability to beneficially 
use a water right to which he or she is already lawfully entitled. 
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surrounding the wells, thereby forming a large cone of depression, which is capturing and 
drawing the Group's surface water rights to a level nearly 100 feet underground. (R. 
198.) 
The City does not dispute that its conduct has caused this artificial condition to 
occur beneath the Group's farm lands. Nor does it dispute that the Group's water rights 
are being drawn nearly 100 feet below ground level to replenish the aquifer that is 
continuously being depleted by the City. The City argues only, asserting form over 
substance, that the Group still has "the use of all of their leased or owned water rights in 
the same quantities, amounts, and at the same points of diversion as they did before the 
City put its Hayden well field into production."5 (Appellee's Br. at 10.) Essentially, 
then, the City is arguing that, regardless of the fact that a majority of the Group's surface 
waters is taken by the City's wells and is, therefore, useless, the City cannot be liable for 
taking the Group's surface water rights because it has not physically intercepted the 
Group's surface waters (while on the surface). Not only does this argument put form 
over substance, it is contrary to the United States Supreme Court's precedent. Indeed, in 
addition to its holding in United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917), which was 
discussed in the Group's opening brief and not addressed by the City, the United States 
Supreme Court reiterated in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), that, even if a 
governmental entity does not physically enter upon the land or physically take property, 
its conduct will nonetheless constitute a taking if it results in "an intrusion so immediate 
5
 But this argument ignores the fact that the Group does not have the same use of its 
water rights. Their water now goes into the wells of the City. 
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and direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his 
exploitation of it." Id. at 265. 
In Causby, the plaintiffs owned property located near an airport runway. Id. at 
258. In addition to residing at the property, the plaintiffs also raised chickens on their 
land. Id. In May 1942, the United States began making "frequent and regular flights of 
army and navy aircraft over" the plaintiffs' property. Id. As a result of these flights, and 
the accompanying noise, the plaintiffs were unable to continue "the use of the property as 
a commercial chicken farm/'6 Id. at 259. In affirming the Court of Claims' finding that a 
taking had occurred, the Court declared, "[gjovemmental action short of acquisition of 
title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of 
all or most of his interest in the subject matter, to amount to a taking." Id. at 259, 263 
n.7. In rejecting the United States' argument that no taking occurred because the "flights 
i I 
are made within the navigable airspace without any physical invasion of the property of 
the landowners," id. at 260, the Court reasoned as follows: 
[i]f, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, [plaintiffs] could 
not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It would be 
as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land 
and taken exclusive possession of it. 
... The fact that the planes never touched the surface would be as irrelevant 
as the absence in this day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of 
real estate. The owner's right to possess and exploit the land—that is to 
say, his beneficial ownership of it—would be destroyed.... 
There is no material difference between the supposed case and the present 
one, except that here enjoyment and use of the land are not completely 
6
 This was so because "[a]s many as six to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by 
flying into the walls from fright." Id. 
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destroyed. But that does not seem to us to be controlling.... 
Id. at 261-62 (emphasis added). 
As in Causby, although the City has not physically entered upon the Group's 
properties to divert the Group's surface water rights that are now vainly used to irrigate 
their lands, the effects of its conduct in continuously over-pumping the Hayden Well 
Field wells and, consequently, creating the extended cone of depression are so complete 
as to deprive the Group of most of their property interest in their surface waters rights. 
Indeed, because the cone of depression intercepts the Group's irrigation water and draws 
it nearly 100 feet below ground to replenish the depleted unconfmed aquifer, the Group 
cannot beneficially use their water rights. Thus, the City's conduct in depriving the 
Group of the ability to beneficially use their surface water rights constitutes a taking, and 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City should be reversed. 
b. The Group Has a Protectable Property Interest in their Lands 
In addition to taking the Group's surface water rights, the City has also taken the 
value and benefit of the Group's lands by preventing the Group from beneficially 
irrigating those lands. It is undisputed that the Group has a protectable property interest 
in their land. See Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 
1244 (Utah 1990) ("The kinds of property subject to the [eminent domain] right ... is 
practically unlimited. Under general principles of eminent domain, 'property' includes 
but is not limited to land and improvements subject to the substantive law of real 
property." (internal quotations and citations omitted)). It is also undisputed that, as a 
This same reasoning also applies to near-surface water and land owned by the Group. 
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result of the City's conduct in over-pumping the Hayden Well Field wells, which, in turn, 
has prevented the Group from beneficially using their surface water rights to irrigate their 
property, the once highly productive farm and pasture lands have transformed into barren 
lands on which little, if any, crops, or even natural vegetation, will grow. Because the 
City's conduct has destroyed the Group's ability to use their lands, the City must 
compensate the Group for such damages, as mandated by the Utah and United States 
Constitutions.8 See Colman v. Utah State Land Bd, 795 P.2d 622, 626 (Utah 1990) 
(defining taking as "any substantial interference with private property which destroys or 
materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in 
any substantial degree abridged or destroyed." (internal quotations omitted)). 
c The Group Has a Protectable Property Interest in the Near-Surface 
Waters Below Their Lands 
Finally, the Group has a separate and independent protectable property interest in 
the near-surface waters that support natural vegetation. The general rule in Utah is that 
all water in the state is "property of the public." Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (2009). 
However, as discussed in the Group's initial brief, this Court has previously recognized 
an exception to this rule. Specifically, as stated in Riordan v. Westwood, 203 P.2d 922 
Although the City argues that the "amount of crop and cattle expected from a particular 
property is not a protected property interest," (Appellee's Br. at 13), it should be noted 
that, as in Causby, where the United States' flights prevented the plaintiffs from using 
their property as a chicken farm, the City's conduct in this case has destroyed the Group's 
ability to use their lands as they have historically done, i.e., to raise crops and pasture 
cattle. This is so because the cone of depression created by the City's over-pumping of 
the unconfined Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer deprives the Group of the benefit of irrigating 
their properties. Thus, pursuant to Causby, because the effects of the City's conduct "are 
so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter," 
the City's conduct constitutes a taking. 328 U.S. at 263 n.7. 
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(Utah 1949), 
[wjhere, ... in its natural state water is diffused and percolates through the 
soil so near the surface that without artificial diversion or application it 
produces plant life and thereby beneficially affects the land, and where its 
course cannot be traced onto the lands of any person other than the owner 
of the land where it is found, such water is percolating waters and as such 
are a part of the soil, they are not public waters, and the right to the use 
thereof cannot be acquired by appropriation under our appropriation statute. 
Id at 929. 
In arguing against application of the Riordan exception, the City attempts to 
deflect the Court's inquiry by claiming that the Group has not alleged damages to natural 
vegetation. (Appellee's Br. at 17.) But this argument misses the point. The point is 
whether or not the near-surface water has been taken, not what grows because of it. 
Also in arguing against application of the Riordan exception, the City relies 
heavily on Weber Basin. However, just as this Court distinguished Weber Basin from 
Riordan, the Weber Basin case is also clearly distinguishable from the present case. In its 
opinion, the Weber Basin Court recognized that, pursuant to Riordan, "[i]t seems that the 
landowner does have some rights in the waters naturally occurring in his soil in the right 
to use and exercise dominion over them while they remain therein" such that "no one 
from the outside could, in effect, pirate the waters, by making an artificial canal or other 
excavation for the purpose of draining the land, without being held responsible." 328 
9
 This claim also ignores the record. The Group's responses to the City's discovery 
requests clearly state that, as a result of the City's conduct, "the trees and grass on the 
affected properties died and the North Hayden Group could no longer produce hay as 
they had before." (R. 146.) And, in their opposition to the City's motion for summary 
judgment, the Group again asserted that the near-surface water table sustained plant life 
in the form of cottonwood and cedar trees on the land, which died after the City began 
mining the unconfined Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer. (R. 189-90,256.) 
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P.2d at 178. The Court then declared that such a situation was not before it. Id. 
Such a situation is, however, presently before this Court. While it is true that the 
City has not excavated the surface of the Group's lands to drain the near-surface water 
under those lands, the City has caused an artificial vacuum to occur directly beneath the 
Group's land that captures and diverts the near-surface water that had historically 
sustained plant life on those lands. Thus, although the City's means of interference 
differs from the means employed in Riordan, the result remains the same—the City's 
conduct has taken the near-surface water underlying the Group's properties. 
Consequently, the City should be liable to the Group for the damages they have sustained 
as a result of the City's conduct in draining the Group's near-surface waters. 
The City also argues that the Riordan exception should not apply in this case 
because the near-surface waters constitute part of an established aquifer. But it should be 
noted that Mr. Rogers has opined that the aquifer "supports a near surface water table." 
(R. 201 (emphasis added).) It is this near-surface water table that provides the water 
afforded protection pursuant to the rule announced in Riordan. The City has taken this 
water by causing the unconfined aquifer to drop over 80 feet. 
Lastly, relying solely on Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, 
5 P.3d 1206, the City argues that Riordan does not reflect the law as it currently exists in 
this State. Silver Fork does not, however, overrule the limited exception announced in 
Riordan, and the City has set forth no basis or reasoning for the Court to do so now. 
10
 In Weber Basin, previously appropriated water was being stored upstream in a 
reservoir, not drained from the land of Gailey. Here, the City is not merely storing 
appropriated water; instead, it is draining the water directly from the Group's lands. 
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2. T H E DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
THE NORTH HAYDEN GROUP'S INTERFERENCE CLAIMS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWS THAT THE CITY HAS INTERFERED WITH THE GROUP'S WATER RIGHTS 
In an apparent attempt to excuse its actions, the City asserts that the Group's 
claims for interference allege only that the Group's "owned and leased water rights are 
not as effective in irrigating their properties as they were prior to the City putting it[s] 
own water into production." (Appellee's Br. at 19.) But this argument mischaracterizes 
the record. The Group has alleged, and the undisputed evidence has shown, that the 
City's continuous over-pumping of the Hayden Well Field wells has not simply made the 
Group's water rights less effective. Rather, the City's mining of the unconfmed Neola-
Whiterocks Aquifer has created an artificial vacuum, in essence, underlying each of the 
Group's lands. This vacuum captures the appropriated surface water applied to the lands 
and then draws that water down nearly 100 feet to replenish the depleted aquifer. Those 
waters are then available only to the City to be pumped by it through its wells. 
Although the City's interference with the Group's surface water rights is not as 
obvious as a typical interference case, such as when a canal is unlawfully diverted to 
another's property, the City's conduct in over-pumping its wells and mining the aquifer 
has nonetheless directly interfered with the Group's surface water rights in a manner that 
is prohibited by Utah law. Indeed, as stated in Current Creek Irrigation Co, v. Andrews, 
344 P.2d 528 (Utah 1959), precedent ignored by the City in its brief, this Court has 
consistently enjoined conduct that has "had the effect of preventing a prior user from 
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continuing a beneficial use of underground waters."11 Id. at 531. As the undisputed 
evidence presented to the trial court establishes that the City's conduct has "had the effect 
of preventing a prior user from continuing a beneficial use of [surface] waters," the trial 
court should have applied the "rule of reasonableness" as set forth in Wayman v. Murray 
City Corp., 458 P.2d 861 (Utah 1969). That rule provides that "[a]ll users are required 
where necessary to employ reasonable and efficient means in taking their own waters in 
relation to others to the end that wastage of water is avoided and that the greatest amount 
of available water is put to beneficial use." Id. at 865. Applying this rule would have 
required the trial court to evaluate the "total situation," including the "quantity of water 
available, the average annual recharge in the [aquifer], the existing rights and their 
priorities." Id. Because the trial court failed to apply the rule and conduct the required 
analysis, this Court should reverse and remand with instructions to do so. 
In attempting to absolve the trial court from its failure to apply the rule of 
reasonableness, the City argues, without authority, that the rule should not be applied 
when the conflicting water rights involved are both underground and surface water rights. 
(Appellee's Br. at 19-20.) However, such an arbitrary distinction ignores the physical 
reality, recognized by Utah law and the United States Supreme Court, that 
1
 Although the issue before the Current Creek Court concerned underground waters, the 
ruling is equally applicable to this conflict given the fact that Utah's statutory scheme 
governing appropriation of water does not distinguish between surface and underground 
water. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (2009) ("All waters in this state, whether above or 
under the ground are hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all 
existing rights to the use thereof."); id. § 73-3-8 (2009) (setting forth requirements for 
approval of application to appropriate, which include, inter alia, a finding that "there is 
unappropriated water in the proposed source" and that "the proposed use will not impair 
existing rights or interfere with the more beneficial use of the water"). 
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"[groundwater and surface water are physically interrelated as integral parts of the 
hydrologic cycle." Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotations omitted). Recognition of this interconnection of 
groundwater and surface waters is integral to Utah's water law, as stated in Silver Fork 
Pipeline, where this Court held as follows: 
We have consistently held that an appropriator of water rights also owns a 
vested interest in the sources of that water, and no one may interfere with 
the source of the appropriator's water supply in a way that diminishes the 
quantity or quality of the appropriated water. This principle holds true 
regardless of how far the source may be from the place of use, and 
regardless of whether the source waters flow on the surface or 
underground. 
2000 UT 3 at f 22 n.6 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
The City also argues that this Court should not balance the rights of the City to 
beneficially use its water with the rights of the Group to beneficially use their surface 
water because such a balancing was already performed by the State Engineer. But such is 
clearly not the case. Indeed, this Court has stated on several occasions that the "office of 
state engineer was not created to adjudicate vested rights between parties, but to 
administer and supervise the appropriation of the waters of the state." Whitmore v. 
Murray City, 154 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1944). Consequently, the State Engineer "acts in 
an administrative capacity only and has no authority to determine rights of parties." Id. 
Accordingly, under Utah law, it was the responsibility and obligation of the trial 
Also, the State Engineer's approval of the City's change applications that allowed 
diversion from the Hayden wells is based on a "reason to believe" standard not applicable 
here, see Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 (2009), and is specifically subject to prior water 
rights, see id. 73-3-3 (2009). 
4819-1650-4068/NO075-001 14 
court to balance the competing property interests of the parties. See Johnson v. Mt. 
Ogden Enters., Inc., 460 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1969) ("[Ejvery person has a right to use 
his own property as he sees fit so long as that use does not invade the rights of his 
neighbor unreasonably and substantially." (emphasis added).); N.M. Long & Co. v. 
Cannon-Papanikolas Constr. Co., 343 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1959) ("When conflicts of 
this character arise it is necessary to give consideration to the basic purposes for which 
property is possessed as established by the customs and practices of people in the use of 
property of similar character. It is the policy of the law to recognize the propriety of such 
uses and encourage the improvement of property so that it may be put to its best 
advantage."). In this case, it is evident that the City's mining of the unconfmed aquifer, 
which has in turn rendered useless and valueless the lands and surface water rights in the 
surrounding area, is not putting the property to its best advantage; rather, such conduct is 
wasting and destroying what was once valuable property. This waste is unnecessary and, 
indeed, unreasonable given the fact that the City may easily obtain the water that it has 
appropriated by simply deepening its wells so that it pumps from the confined Duchesne 
River Formation rather than the unconfined Neola-Whiterocks surface aquifer. 
The trial court erred when it did not consider or apply the rule of reasonableness 
and did not balance the competing property interests of the parties. Accordingly, the 
Group requests that this Court reverse the trial court and remand the cause for trial. 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CITY DID NOT 
HAVE A DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM OPERATING ITS WELLS IN A MANNER THAT WAS 
INJURIOUS TO THE NORTH HAYDEN GROUP 
On appeal, the City argues only that the Group's interference and negligence 
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claims should be dismissed because it owes no duty to the Group to refrain from using its 
1-3 
property in a manner that substantially interferes with the Group's property rights. In 
so arguing, the City relies on the case of Estate of Steed v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 
846 P.2d 1223 (Utah 1992). However, Steed does not address the issue of whether a 
property owner has a duty to refrain from injuring a neighboring landowner. Rather, the 
issue before the Steed Court was whether the plaintiff could legally appropriate the 
defendant's waste water such that the defendant should be compelled to maintain the 
same level of waste water for the benefit of the plaintiff. See id. at 1224. In denying the 
plaintiffs claim, the Court held that, although waste water may be reappropriated, "the 
reappropriator acquired no rights as against the original appropriator to have the waste 
water continue to escape to the wash." Id. at 1225. 
In this case, the Group has not alleged that they have a vested right to abandoned 
or waste water of the City or even that they have a vested right to have the aquifer remain 
at its historic level. Rather, the Group has alleged that they have a vested right to the 
beneficial use of their earlier appropriated surface waters and that that right has been 
substantially invaded by the City's negligent conduct in drilling shallow wells, mining 
the aquifer, and creating an artificial vacuum to form beneath their land which intercepts 
and diverts the Group's waters. Thus, Steed is inapplicable to this case.14 
n 
It appears from its failure to respond to the arguments raised in the Group's initial brief 
that the City is now conceding that the Group's interference and negligence claims are 
not barred by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
The City also erroneously argues that Wayman imposes no duty on the City to cease 
the operation of its pumps. (Appellee's Br. at 23.). While Wayman did refuse to apply a 
per se rule in cases with competing water right interests, the Court expressly adopted the 
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Utah's common law imposes a duty on property owners to refrain from using their 
property in a manner that would harm the property interests of others. See, e.g., Johnson, 
460 P.2d at 336 ("[Ejvery person has a right to use his own property as he sees fit so long 
as that use does not invade the rights of his neighbor unreasonably and substantially.").15 
Further, Utah's Legislature has imposed an additional "statutory duty" on "'[t]he owner 
of any ditch ... or other watercourse [to] maintain the same in repair so as to prevent 
waste of water or damage to the property of others.'" Erickson v. Bennion, 503 P.2d 139, 
140 (Utah 1972) (third alteration in original) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-8 (1953)). 
Thus, pursuant to both statutory and common law, the City has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care in the development and operation of its wells. As the trial court's ruling 
failed to properly consider this duty, its grant of summary judgment was erroneous. 
4. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE CONTINUOUS 
TORT RULE 
In arguing against application of the continuous tort rule, the City claims that each 
of the Group's causes of action "stem from the City establishing wells" in the unconfined 
Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer. (Appellee's Br. at 26.) The City wrongly compares this case 
to the hypothetical case in which a city installs a road on private property, claiming it was 
"rule of reasonableness," which requires the trial court to conduct an "analysis of the total 
situation" in order to determine whether "the means of diversion ... are reasonable and 
consistent with the state of development of water in the area." 458 P.2d at 865-66. In 
this case, the trial court refused to apply the rule of reasonableness and thus erred. 
Indeed, this concept is the very genesis for the claim of nuisance. See id. (affirming 
trial court's ruling that defendant's operation of a drive-in theater constituted a nuisance 
because such use of defendant's property "tended to substantially and unreasonably 
interfere with the plaintiffs enjoyment of their property"); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-
1101(1) (2009) ("A nuisance is anything which is ... an obstruction to the free use of 
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property ...."). 
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the initial installation of the wells, not the use of the wells, that triggered the statute of 
limitations and that, therefore, the continuous tort rule does not apply. 
However, in so arguing, the City fails to recognize that the actual installation of 
the wells on its own property did not result in any damage to the Group—the wells were 
lawfully established on the City's property and their existence is perfectly legal. Rather, 
the Group's damages have resulted from the cumulative effect of the City's mining of the 
aquifer, i.e., the City's continuous over-pumping of the wells without allowing the 
aquifer time to adequately recharge. Consequently, because the installation of the wells 
did not result in any damage to the Group's property rights, the Group could not have 
maintained a cause of action against the City at the time the wells were installed. See 
Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv.t Inc., 194 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah 1990) ("The 
general policy in Utah is that statutes of limitations commence to run when the cause of 
action accrues. A tort cause of action accrues when it becomes remediable in the courts, 
that is, when all elements of a cause of action come into being." (citation omitted)). 
Unlike the City's analogy of installing a road on private property, the City's 
wrongful conduct in this case is not based on one discrete action that occurred in the 
As shown by the City's own inconsistent statements, it is impossible to isolate one 
single date for purposes of determining when the statute of limitations would have begun 
to run because the North Hay den Group's claims accrued as a result of the cumulative 
effect of the City's continuous over-pumping of the wells. Compare Appellee's Brief at 
27 (stating "[i]f their damage is being caused by the City's wells or well design then that 
cause of action accrued when they were first placed in production, which according to the 
complaint was in the 1990s." (emphasis added)) with id. ("They are asserting that even 
though the City took their property for public use beginning in 1980's, and that they 
knew about this, the statute of limitations did not start to run when the taking first took 
place, but each time the use occurs." (emphasis added)). 
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past. Instead, the City's wrongful conduct in this case is ongoing. Indeed, it is the 
continuous, almost daily, pumping of the Hayden Well Field wells that has created the 
cone of depression, which is intercepting the Group's waters. The City's ongoing 
conduct can be discontinued at any time, and such cessation of over-pumping will 
prevent further damages from occurring to the Group's properties and water rights. Thus, 
as set forth in Breiggar Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 53, 52 P.3d 
1133, because the City's conduct consists of "multiple acts" that "have occurred, and 
continue to occur," the wrongful conduct should be characterized as "continuing." Id. at 
T| 11 ("We characterize a trespass as 'permanent' to acknowledge that the act or acts of 
trespass have ceased to occur. We characterize a trespass as 'continuing' to acknowledge 
that multiple acts of trespass have occurred, and continue to occur ...."). 
5- THE CITY'S MINING OF THE AQUIFER VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY 
In its brief, the City does not contest that it is mining the unconfmed Neola-
Whiterocks Aquifer; rather, the City argues only that it is entitled to mine the aquifer 
because it has been granted water rights from the State Engineer. In so arguing, the City 
claims that its conduct is in conformity with the public policy of the State of Utah.18 
However, the declarations of the Legislature demonstrate otherwise. 
17 
Because the City continuously shuts off and turns on the well pumps, a more analogous 
hypothetical would be if the City had installed a temporary roadblock on the Group's 
property, which the City would take down at the end of the day and then re-set up the 
following day. Such conduct would clearly qualify as a continuing tort because the 
City's conduct continues to occur each day. Therefore, the statute of limitations would 
not begin to run until the end of the continuing wrongful conduct. 
The City's view of public policy harkens back to the 19th Century when wetlands were 
worthless and should be drained and rivers were consistently dried up without concern. 
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The Utah Legislature has declared its intent to prevent the mining of underground 
basins and aquifers on at least three separate occasions. First, in 2006, the Utah 
Legislature passed the Groundwater Management Plan (the "Plan"), which clearly 
expresses the Legislature's policy against the mining of aquifers. See Groundwater 
Management Plan, 2006 Utah Laws Ch. 193 (codified as Utah Code Ann. § 73-5-15). 
Indeed, that Plan authorizes the State Engineer to adopt groundwater management plans 
to limit the withdrawal of water from a basin or aquifer to the "safe yield," which is 
defined as "the amount of groundwater that can be withdrawn from a groundwater basin 
over a period of time without exceeding the long-term recharge of the basin or 
unreasonably affecting the basin's physical and chemical integrity." Utah Code Ann. § 
73-5-15(l)(b), (4)(a)-(b) (2009). Although the City is correct in asserting that the Plan 
must be based on "the principles of prior appropriation," id. § 73-5-15(3)(b), the 
Legislature has firmly declared that withdrawal of water from a basin or aquifer under the 
Plan must not exceed the safe yield1 in order to accomplish the Plan's objectives, which 
are threefold: (1) to "limit groundwater withdrawals to safe yield"; (2) to "protect the 
physical integrity of the aquifer"; and (3) to "protect water quality." Id. § 73-5-15(2)(b). 
In addition to this firm pronouncement, the Legislature approved a resolution in 
2007 that reaffirmed the State's policy against the mining of aquifers. Specifically, in the 
Joint Resolution Regarding Action on Groundwater in Snake Valley, the Legislature 
urged the Governor to "carefully assess the [Snake Valley] groundwater development 
19
 Section 73-5-15 provides one limited exception to this rule: upon determination of the 
State Engineer, the groundwater management plan may be implemented gradually. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-5-15(4)(a)-(b). 
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project's potential economic, social, and environmental consequences in Utah, including 
assessing impacts to indigenous flora and fauna." HJ.R. 1 at 3 (Addendum E to Brief of 
Appellants). And, in 2009, the Legislature enacted the Snake Valley Aquifer Research 
Team and Advisory Council to investigate the affect the proposed project would have on 
"surface water and groundwater," "vegetation," "agriculture," "soils," and "air quality." 
H.B. 120 at 5 (codified as Utah Code Ann. §§ 63C-12-101 to -108 (2009) (Addendum F 
to Brief of Appellants). Thus, the Legislature has clearly articulated its policy of 
preventing the mining of aquifers and the resulting environmental consequences. 
Apparently recognizing the Legislature's policy against the mining of aquifers, the 
City resorts to Wayman as support for its argument that its mining of the unconfined 
Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer is proper. Specifically, the City relies on the following 
language in Wayman: "Because of the vital importance of water ... both our statutory 
and decisional law have been fashioned in recognition of the desirability and of the 
necessity of insuring the highest possible development and of the most continuous 
beneficial use of all available water with as little waste as possible." 458 P.2d at 863. 
However, as discussed, supra, the City's mining of the unconfined aquifer does 
not promote the policy enunciated in Wayman because the City's conduct has resulted in 
a substantial waste of water. Indeed, because the City's excessive withdrawal of water 
from the unconfined Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer has created the cone of depression 
underlying the Group's lands, the Group's once-valuable and beneficially used senior 
water rights are now useless. Had the City simply drilled its wells deeper to reach the 
confined Duchesne River Formation and encased those portions of its wells within the 
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unconfined aquifer, the City would have been able to withdraw all of the water which it 
has appropriated without any effect on the Group's water rights.20 Alternatively, the City 
could limit its diversion to the safe yield of the aquifer. Either would have been in 
accordance with the dictates of Wayman. But as it stands, the City's conduct in mining 
the unconfined aquifer is resulting in the waste of thousands of acre feet of water each 
year, which in turn has detrimentally affected the lands surrounding the Hayden wells. 
The City also argues against the application of the public trust doctrine in this 
case. However, as discussed in the Brief of the Amici Curiae^ the public trust doctrine 
applies to prevent the City's unfettered mining and destruction of the Neola-Whiterocks 
Aquifer by placing limits on the extent of the City's beneficial use of its approved water 
rights. While the trial court essentially held that the City's approved water rights are 
absolute, the public trust doctrine holds otherwise. 
The City argues that the public trust doctrine is not implicated in this case because 
this is not a case involving protection of the "natural environment" or "natural flora and 
fauna" but is instead a case "where two water users are in a contest over two unnatural 
The City erroneously claims that "[t]he North Hayden Group has taken the position 
that for their own economic interest the City must leave the water underlying their ground 
without use." (Appellee's Br. at 30.) As discussed above, the Group's claims against the 
City stem from the City's mining of the unconfined aquifer. The option is available to 
the City at any time to deepen its wells so that it may withdraw the water it has 
appropriated from the confined Duchesne River Formation. Because the Duchesne River 
Formation is a confined aquifer, no cone of depression will result from the withdrawal of 
water from that aquifer. Thus, both the Group and the City would be able to beneficially 
use the water which they have appropriated. In sum, this dispute exists because the City 
drilled shallow wells in an apparent effort to save well-drilling costs. 
The City also appears to question whether the public trust doctrine is even recognized 
in this state. (See Appellee's Br. at 28.) However, the public trust doctrine has a well-
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uses of the water." (See Appellee's Br. at 28.) But this argument is contrary to the 
record. The North Hayden Group's Complaint alleges that, "[a]s a result of the pumping 
from the Hayden Well Field, the [Group's] properties have become almost completely 
dewatered. The land, which was fertile and productive, is now largely barren." (R. 9.) 
And the Group likewise explained in its Response to the City's motion for summary 
judgment that natural pasture land has become barren, and natural cottonwood and cedar 
trees that once existed on the properties have died. (R. 265.) Thus, the Group has 
alleged that, not only has the City's mining of the unconfmed Neola-Whiterocks Aquifer 
resulted in dewatering the surrounding lands, the City's conduct has also resulted in 
environmental damages to the plant life indigenous to the area. 
More importantly, the City's myopic view of this case as simply a contest between 
two water users ignores the widespread and long-lasting effects its conduct will have on 
not just the Group but on all citizens of Utah. It is well-recognized that "[groundwater 
mining is a serious concern .... Problems caused by prolonged overdraft include surface 
land subsidence, reduction of basin storage capacity through impaction, water quality 
degradation through contaminant migration and saline intrusion, interference with senior 
documented history in Utah's courts, both in principle and in name. See Conatser v. 
Johnson, 2008 UT 48, f 15, 194 P.3d 897 (holding that "the scope of the public's 
easement in state waters provides the public the right to engage in all recreational 
activities that utilize the water and does not limit the public to activities that can be 
performed upon the water."); Nat'I Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 
869 P.2d 909, 919 (Utah 1993) (noting that public trust doctrine protects ecological 
integrity and public recreational uses of public lands); Colman, 795 P.2d at 635 (finding 
that the state "exercised its powers under the public trust in leasing" a brine canal 
easement to plaintiff); JJ.N.P. Co,, 655 P.2d at 1136 ("The State regulates the use of the 
water, in effect, as trustee for the benefit of the people."). 
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surface water rights, increased costs of groundwater retrieval, and economic depletion of 
the groundwater basin." Susan Batty Peterson, Note, Designation and Protection of 
Critical Groundwater Areas, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1393, 1395 (1991). 
Given that "[a]ll waters in this state, whether above or under the ground are hereby 
declared to be the property of the public," Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1, the public trust 
doctrine prevents the mining of groundwater as detrimental to the public's interest. 
Public trust principles pervade Utah's law, requiring the State Engineer to consider the 
effects on the "natural stream environment" and the "public welfare" of various activities 
relating to both surface and groundwater. See, e.g., id. §§ 73-3-8(l)(b)(i); 73-3-
29(4)(b)(ii)-(iv). The early triad of uses protected by the doctrine—navigation, fishing, 
and commerce—were protected because they were necessary for the welfare and 
existence of the early agrarian societies. In recent years, the doctrine has been extended 
to protect the natural environment as an important public benefit. Protecting the State's 
aquifers from irreversible degradation is thus at the heart of the public trust doctrine. 
And contrary to the City's assertions otherwise, this case presents the very 
situation that the public trust doctrine is intended to prevent. The City's mining of the 
unconfined aquifer threatens the existence and long-term vitality of the Neola-Whiterocks 
Aquifer. Depletion of this valuable resource, owned by the public, would be felt for 
generations to come. Pumping at the City's current levels has decimated the natural 
vegetation, including pasture used by the Group for decades. Continued pumping will 
destroy the aquifer forever. Even under the City's limited and dated view of the public 
trust doctrine, the City's continued mining of the unconfined aquifer threatens, and has 
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damaged, the "healthy environment" and the "natural flora and fauna." 
The public trust doctrine is squarely implicated in this case because it serves to 
correct the trial court's erroneous conclusions, which the City embraces, that an approved 
water right is absolute and diversion and use of such a water right is subject to no 
limitation. (R. 294, 299.) If the trial court's conclusions are allowed to stand in this case, 
the ability of the public trust doctrine to protect some of the state's most vital natural 
resources and ensure their continued benefit to the future welfare of the public may well 
indeed diminish, just like the aquifers the doctrine once preserved. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Utah is a desert state, water is a scare and valuable natural resource. 
Indeed, given our dry climate and our limited water resources, this Court has likened a 
drop of water to a drop of gold. But despite these stark realities, Roosevelt City comes 
before this Court and asks that it be allowed to continue, without restraint, in mining an 
unconfined aquifer, even when such conduct has resulted and will continue to result in 
the waste of thousands of acre feet of water each year held by the North Hayden Group 
and others. As such conduct is clearly contrary to the State's laws and policies regarding 
use of the State's waters, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the City on the Group's claims. 
The claim of the City that the parallels between this situation and the Snake Valley 
Controversy are "tenuous, if nonexistent," (Appellee's Br. at 29), only emphasizes once 
again the City's refusal to acknowledge the facts. Snake Valley and this matter closely 
parallel each other, and affirming the trial court's ruling will compromise Utah's ability 
to prevent future efforts to protect the integrity and viability of the public's aquifers. 
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